The Coastwatchers began in 1919 as a network of brave civilian observers along Australia’s northern frontier, using their local knowledge to keep watch over the seas.
As World War II loomed, their mission became perilous, operating in remote jungles and isolated islands to gather vital intelligence on enemy movements.
Despite the dangers, these often unsung heroes played a crucial role in the fight for the Pacific.
Now, more than a century after their founding, it's time to build on the legacy of the Coastwatchers by establishing a network of civilian Cyberwatchers to help defend Australia against the threat of international information warfare.
Beyond the well-known cybercrime and national security challenges from countries such as Russia and China, attacks come in the form of online mis- and dis-information aimed at undermining our social cohesion on issues as diverse as public health (vaccinations), immigration and representative democracy.
This state of constant hybrid warfare by those who wish to do us harm is not a temporary inconvenience – it is a persistent and serious threat to Australia, our democracy, and our way of life.
We need to muster all our resources to counter these foreign measures.
Regrettably, we also need to prepare for things to get worse, and the risk of military conflict in our region cannot be excluded.
Should such a situation arise, our already strained resources would be under significant added stress.
Consequently, we need to strengthen our deterrence, protection, and resilience in the cyber environment. Indeed, doing so may help prevent an open and/or military confrontation.
A “crowdsourced” civilian volunteer cyber reserve capability in the form a “cyber intelligence and information militia” as proposed here may be a valuable – and much-needed – addition to Australia’s security and defence capabilities.
In a sense, it is a whole-of-society response to a whole-of-society challenge.
In my paper Crowdsourcing an Australian cyber intelligence and information militia (June 2024), I canvas options for an Australian “cyber intelligence and information militia”.
This would be a civilian volunteer cyber reserve capability fit to engage in open-source intelligence (OSINT) and information warfare.
Australia’s population generally has high level of education. To date, this is an under-utilised defence resource. Anyone with time, patience, and basic computer literacy can play a role in OSINT and information warfare.
Thus, my proposal seeks to capture, and make use of, a broad section of the Australian public.
In essence, the idea is to crowdsource a civilian cyber capability where each member focuses on tasks within their specific competencies.
With that in mind, what is proposed here is a “cyber militia” that undertakes defence-related activities (broadly defined) in or pertaining to cyberspace on behalf of the Commonwealth and under the coordination and guidance of the Commonwealth, but outside the ambit of Australia’s regular armed forces or national security structure.
It seems clear that states are now in a constant state of information warfare.
The Australian Electoral Commission has recently expressed concerns about its ability to detect and deter AI-generated misinformation at the next federal election, potentially from overseas actors.
An Australian cyber intelligence and information militia may be a valuable tool both for defensive and offensive information warfare.
Any country creating a resource capable of undertaking the types of roles discussed above must take great care to ensure the resource created remains under its effective control.
At the same time, a cyber militia of the type envisaged here must be able to operate effectively without direct persistent control and guidance.
Obviously, this would require a degree of risk and associated trust but that should not be difficult to manage.
Thus, a militia member going rogue may be liable to prosecution in the same manner as members of the public may be today.
It is also appropriate to consider two related issues, namely that of: (1) Australians engaging in the operations of a foreign cyber militia; and (2) foreigners joining an Australian cyber intelligence and information militia.
The reason these matters cannot be ignored is found in the fact an Australian cyber intelligence and information militia could benefit greatly from the “surge capacity” that could be obtained by opening participation to citizens of allied countries – at least in a time of crisis.
As illustrated by the volunteer “IT army” rapidly established by Ukraine in response to Russia’s aggression, a cyber militia can also be established quickly and at a comparatively low cost depending on structure and capabilities.
Having said that, the potency of a cyber militia can be significantly enhanced by training.
There are credible activities by researchers, NGOs and journalists that monitor, analyse, and counter information operations against Australia.
But these lack a coordinated structure with a proactive agenda, and a focal point for national efforts such as we see in some other countries.
Thus, what is proposed here is something new, and it supplements, rather than competes with, existing initiatives.
* Dan Jerker B Svantesson is a Professor of Law in Bond University where he is a co-director for the Centre for Space, Cyberspace & Data Law. He is also a Senior Fellow with the Social Cyber Institute.